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Note 
 
CLASS V. UNITED STATES: AN IMPERFECT APPLICATION OF 
THE MENNA-BLACKLEDGE DOCTRINE TO POST-GUILTY 
PLEA CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS 
NIKOLAUS ALBRIGHT∗ 
In Class v. United States,1 the Supreme Court addressed whether an 
unconditional guilty plea bars a federal criminal defendant from challenging 
the constitutionality of the statute of conviction on direct appeal.2  Although 
an unconditional guilty plea does waive some constitutional claims,3 the 
Court ruled that a guilty plea does not waive a defendant’s ability to chal-
lenge the constitutionality of the statute of conviction because such a claim 
falls within the Menna-Blackledge exception.4  The Court correctly held 
that the Menna-Blackledge doctrine applies to claims that challenge the 
constitutionality of the statute of conviction because such claims challenge 
the government’s power to constitutionally convict a defendant.5  The 
Court’s holding is consistent with its ruling in United States v. Broce6 be-
cause Class’s claim did not contradict the conduct admitted in his guilty 
plea, and the Court’s holding is compatible with Rule 11 of the Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure because the text of the Rule does not require a 
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 1.  138 S. Ct. 798 (2018).  
 2.  Id. at 803. 
 3.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(a)(2).  The Rule states: 
Conditional Plea.  With the consent of the court and the government, a defendant may 
enter a conditional plea of guilty or nolo contendere, reserving in writing the right to 
have an appellate court review an adverse determination of a specified pretrial motion. 
A defendant who prevails on appeal may then withdraw the plea. 
Id.  
 4.  Class, 138 S. Ct. at 805–06. 
 5.  See infra Section IV.A. 
 6.  488 U.S. 563 (1989). 
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defendant to reserve a constitutional challenge through a conditional plea.7  
Additionally, the Court’s holding was appropriate because Rule 11(a)(2) 
alone does not provide adequate procedural safeguards for defendants as 
they enter their plea,8 and the Court properly balanced the defendant’s in-
terest in asserting constitutional values and in being free from punishment 
against the government’s interests in maintaining the finality of convictions 
and conserving resources.9  The Court, however, failed to promote uni-
formity in the federal circuits by not addressing the current circuit split on 
the issue and by neglecting to adopt a clear rule of law.10 
In Part I, this Note will summarize the factual and procedural back-
ground leading to the Court’s opinion.11  Part II will explore the roots of 
guilty plea jurisprudence12 and the historical development of guilty pleas as 
a waiver of constitutional claims on appeal.13  Part III will explain the rea-
soning underlying the Court’s decision.14  Finally, Part IV of this Note will 
(1) assert that the Menna-Blackledge doctrine is applicable to Class’s claims 
and is consistent with the Court’s holding in Broce;15 (2) contend that the 
Court’s holding is consistent with Rule 11;16 (3) argue that Rule 11(a)(2) 
alone inadequately protects defendants’ procedural rights;17 (4) maintain 
that the Court properly balanced the parties’ competing interests;18 and (5) 
demonstrate that the Court failed to promote uniformity in the federal cir-
cuits.19 
I.  THE CASE 
In September 2013, a federal grand jury indicted petitioner Rodney 
Class for possessing firearms in his parked vehicle on the grounds of the 
United States Capitol in violation of 40 U.S.C. § 5104(e).20  Appearing pro 
se, Class asked the United States District Court for the District of Columbia 
to dismiss the indictment, claiming the statute of conviction violated the 
                                                          
 7.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(a)(2); see infra Section IV.B. 
 8.  See infra Section IV.C. 
 9.  See infra Section IV.D. 
 10.  See infra Section IV.E. 
 11.  See infra Part I.   
 12.  See infra Section II.A. 
 13.  See infra Section II.B–D. 
 14.  See infra Part III. 
 15.  See infra Section IV.A. 
 16.  See infra Section IV.B. 
 17.  See infra Section IV.C. 
 18.  See infra Section IV.D. 
 19.  See infra Section IV.E. 
 20.  Class, 138 S. Ct. at 802; see 40 U.S.C. § 5104(e)(1) (2012) (“An individual . . . may not 
carry on or have readily accessible . . . on the Grounds or in any of the Capitol Buildings a fire-
arm . . . .”). 
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Second Amendment and the absence of fair notice that weapons were 
banned in the parking lot denied him due process.21  The district court re-
jected both claims and denied Class’s motion to dismiss the indictment.22 
After the district court’s ruling, Class pleaded guilty to the charges 
against him and entered into a written plea.23  The plea agreement included 
five categories of expressly waived rights and three categories of claims 
that were not waived,24 but it failed to mention the right to appeal the con-
stitutionality of the statute of conviction.25  Additionally, the plea agree-
ment stated: “No agreements, promises, understandings, or representations 
have been made by the parties or their counsel other than those contained in 
writing herein, nor will any such agreements . . . be made unless committed 
to writing and signed . . . .”26  The district court reviewed the terms of the 
plea agreement with Class to ensure the validity of the plea, accepted his 
guilty plea, and sentenced him to twenty-four days of imprisonment with 
twelve months of supervised release.27 
Soon thereafter, Class appealed his conviction to the United States 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit and repeated his Sec-
ond Amendment and Due Process Clause claims.28  The D.C. Circuit held 
that “Class could not raise his constitutional claims because, by pleading 
guilty, he had waived them.”29  In its decision, the D.C. Circuit noted that 
instead of reserving the right to appeal his conviction by entering a condi-
tional guilty plea, Class entered an unconditional plea.30  The court listed 
                                                          
 21.  Class, 138 S. Ct. at 802; see U.S. CONST. amend. II (“A well regulated Militia, being 
necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be 
infringed.”); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, lib-
erty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”). 
 22.  Class, 138 S. Ct. at 802. 
 23.  Id.  
 24.  Id.  The expressly waived categories of rights included: 
(1) all defenses based upon the statute of limitations; (2) several specified trial rights; 
(3) the right to appeal a sentence at or below the judicially determined, maximum sen-
tencing guideline range; (4) most collateral attacks on the conviction and sentence; and 
(5) various rights to request or receive information concerning the investigation and 
prosecution of [Class’s] criminal case.   
Id.  The expressly enumerated claims that Class could raise on appeal included “claims based up-
on (1) newly discovered evidence; (2) ineffective assistance of counsel; and (3) certain statutes 
providing for sentence reductions.”  Id.  
 25.  Id.  
 26.  Id.  
 27.  Id.  During the Rule 11 plea inquiry, the district court judge asked Class: “Now, by plead-
ing guilty, you would be generally giving up your rights to appeal.  Do you understand that?”  
United States v. Class, No. 15-3015, 2016 WL 10950032, at *2 (D.C. Cir. July 5, 2016).  Class 
responded, “Yes.”  Id. 
 28.  Class, 138 S. Ct. at 802. 
 29.  Id. at 803. 
 30.  United States v. Class, No. 15-3015, 2016 WL 10950032, at *1 (D.C. Cir. July 5, 2016); 
see FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(a)(2) (providing the option for defendants to enter into a conditional 
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two exceptions to the general rule that an unconditional guilty plea consti-
tutes a waiver of all constitutional claims: “‘the defendant’s claimed right 
not to be haled into court at all,’ and a claim ‘that the court below lacked 
subject-matter jurisdiction over the case.’”31  The D.C. Circuit, without any 
explanation, stated that neither of the exceptions applied to Class’s claims.32  
The United States Supreme Court subsequently granted Class’s petition for 
certiorari to decide “whether in pleading guilty a criminal defendant inher-
ently waives the right to challenge the constitutionality of his statute of 
conviction.”33 
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The acceptance of guilty pleas is prevalent in the criminal justice sys-
tem.34  Their popularity is likely due to the “mutuality of advantage” that 
both defendants and the government enjoy by entering into a plea agree-
ment.35  Defendants have the advantage of reducing their probable sentence, 
while the government has the advantage of conserving judicial and prosecu-
torial resources.36  A guilty plea, however, constitutes a waiver of some im-
portant constitutional rights.37  Yet, a guilty plea does not waive all rights; 
there are certain fundamental rights that “exist beyond the confines of the 
trial” that, if violated, render the defendant’s plea and conviction invalid.38  
Section II.A discusses early common law recognition that a guilty plea is 
not a waiver of all claims on appeal.  Section II.B examines the Supreme 
Court’s shift toward shielding guilty pleas as demonstrated in a trilogy of 
cases—Brady v. United States,39 McMann v. Richardson,40 and Parker v. 
North Carolina41 (“the Brady trilogy”)—and the reaffirmation of the gen-
eral rule that a voluntarily and intelligently entered guilty plea constitutes a 
waiver of all claims on appeal.  Section II.C examines the exceptions the 
                                                          
guilty plea and reserve “the right to have an appellate court review an adverse determination of a 
specified pretrial motion”).  
 31.  Class, 2016 WL 10950032, at *2 (quoting United States v. Delgado-Garcia, 374 F.3d 
1337, 1341 (D.C. Cir. 2004)).  
 32.  Id.  
 33.  Class, 138 S. Ct. at 803. 
 34.  See Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 143 (2012) (noting that “[n]inety-seven percent of 
federal convictions and ninety-four percent of state convictions are the result of guilty pleas”). 
 35.  Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970). 
 36.  Id.  
 37.  See Class, 138 S. Ct. at 805 (noting that a guilty plea waives the privilege against self-
incrimination, the right to trial by jury, and the right to confront accusers (citing McCarthy v. 
United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969))). 
 38.  Id. (quoting and citing Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 324 (1999)); see infra 
Section II.A–C.   
 39.  397 U.S. 742 (1970). 
 40.  397 U.S. 759 (1970). 
 41.  397 U.S. 790 (1970). 
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Supreme Court subsequently carved out of the general rule in Blackledge v. 
Perry42 and Menna v. New York.43  Lastly, Section II.D explores the circuit 
split that resulted from the inconsistent development of the law in the feder-
al circuits in applying the aforementioned exceptions. 
A.  Early Common Law Recognition That a Guilty Plea Is Not a Waiver 
of All Claims 
A guilty plea entails a judgment of conviction that precludes subse-
quent litigation, as would any other judgment absent a plea of guilty.  Cases 
addressing the preclusive effect of guilty pleas date as far back as the 
1800s.44  In Commonwealth v. Hinds,45 one of the first cases to discuss the 
preclusive effect of guilty pleas, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachu-
setts addressed whether a guilty plea has a preclusive effect on a defend-
ant’s claim that the indictment failed to state a crime.46  The court held that 
the guilty plea was not a confession of any crime because the facts admitted 
in the indictment failed to allege any conduct proscribed by law.47  The de-
fendant’s conviction was discharged despite entering a guilty plea because 
he pleaded guilty to something that did not constitute a crime.48 
The principle that a guilty plea is not a waiver of all claims on appeal 
has been reiterated countless times since it appeared in Hinds.  Shortly after 
Hinds, in Carper v. State,49 the Supreme Court of Ohio was faced with de-
ciding whether a guilty plea precludes a defendant’s claim that the indict-
ment failed to state an offense.50  The court went beyond Hinds and held 
that despite pleading guilty, a defendant may object to the court’s or grand 
jury’s jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim in addition to assert-
ing that the indictment defectively failed to state an offense.51  In Klawanski 
v. People,52 the Supreme Court of Illinois faced the same issue presented in 
Hinds and reached the same conclusion: If the indictment fails to allege a 
crime, a guilty plea does not constitute a confession to a crime because, by 
                                                          
 42.  417 U.S. 21 (1974).  
 43.  423 U.S. 61 (1975) (per curiam). 
 44.  See Commonwealth v. Hinds, 101 Mass. 209 (1869) (discussing the preclusive effect of 
guilty pleas in the late 1800s); Carper v. State, 27 Ohio St. 572 (1875) (discussing the right to ob-
jection, in certain circumstances, for defendants who pleaded guilty); United States v. Bayaud, 16 
F. 376, 382 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1883) (noting that post-guilty plea defendants may still claim that the 
indictment failed to allege the acts intended to be proved). 
 45.  101 Mass. 209 (1869).  
 46.  Id. at 209–10.   
 47.  Id. at 211.  
 48.  Id. at 210. 
 49.  27 Ohio St. 572 (1875).  
 50.  Id. at 575. 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  218 Ill. 481 (1905). 
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pleading guilty, the defendant merely admits to what is alleged in the in-
dictment.53 
Although there is a lack of Supreme Court precedent on the preclusive 
effect of guilty pleas at this point in history, the federal circuits began to 
recognize the general rule that a guilty plea is not a waiver of all claims on 
appeal shortly after the aforementioned state cases.  In Hocking Valley 
Railway Co. v. United States,54 the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit addressed whether a defendant may claim that the indictment 
failed to state an offense after entering a plea of nolo contendere.55  The 
court, recognizing Hinds and Carper as support for its decision,  held that a 
plea of nolo contendere should not bar such a claim because it is settled law 
that a defendant may bring such a claim after pleading guilty.56  The court 
refused to make a distinction between a plea of nolo contendere and an out-
right guilty plea for purposes of the asserted claim and reasoned that a plea 
of nolo contendere did not bar the defendant’s claim because a guilty plea 
does not foreclose the claim.57  Years after the Sixth Circuit’s holding, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit went beyond Hock-
ing Valley Railway Co. in United States v. Ury58 and directly held that the 
defendant’s guilty plea did not preclude him from claiming that both the in-
dictment failed to state an offense and the statute was unconstitutional.59  
These cases illustrate the principle that a guilty plea is not a waiver of all 
claims on appeal is rooted in early guilty plea jurisprudence. 
When the Supreme Court was finally confronted with a defendant’s 
post-guilty plea Fifth Amendment challenge to the statute of conviction in 
Haynes v. United States,60 the Court accepted the same principle that ap-
peared in Hinds nearly 100 years prior.  The Court held that the guilty plea 
did not waive Haynes’ constitutional claim of privilege against self-
                                                          
 53.  Id. at 484 (“By a plea of guilty the accused simply confesses that he is guilty in manner 
and form as charged in the indictment, and if the indictment charges no criminal offense, or is oth-
erwise fatally defective, it may be subsequently attacked on that ground.”).  
 54.  210 F. 735 (6th Cir. 1914).  
 55.  Id. at 738.  A plea of nolo contendere is a plea of no contest “by which a defendant does 
not expressly admit his guilt, but nonetheless waives his right to a trial and authorizes the court for 
purposes of the case to treat [them] as if [they] were guilty.”  North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 
25, 35 (1970).  
 56.  Hocking Valley Ry. Co., 210 F. at 739 (“It seems to be the settled rule that, even after 
explicit plea of guilty, defendant may urge, in the reviewing court, such an objection.” (citing 
Carper v. State, 27 Ohio St. 572 (1875); Commonwealth v. Hinds, 101 Mass. 209 (1869))). 
 57.  Id. at 738–39 (“[W]e are satisfied that the plea of nolo contendere should not be con-
strued as a waiver of a right which the plea of guilty does not waive.”). 
 58.  106 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1939). 
 59.  Id. at 28 (“The questions presented put in issue whether the statute is constitutional and 
whether the information charged a crime.  The plea of guilty did not foreclose the appellant from 
the review he now seeks.” (citing Hocking Valley Ry. Co., 210 F. at 738–39)). 
 60.  390 U.S. 85 (1968).  
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incrimination.61  The Court did not provide any explanation for allowing the 
constitutional claim, only noting that it is assumed that a guilty plea would 
not bar a constitutional claim on appeal.62 
B.  The Brady Trilogy: The Supreme Court’s Shift Toward Shielding 
Guilty Pleas 
In 1970, the Supreme Court departed from the long-recognized view 
of guilty pleas and shifted toward “insulating all guilty pleas from subse-
quent attack”63 in the series of cases known as the Brady trilogy.64  In each 
of these cases, the Court grounded its reasoning in the presumed validity of 
voluntarily and intelligently entered guilty pleas.65  In all three cases, the 
Court held that a post-guilty plea defendant may only challenge the volun-
tary and intelligent nature of a guilty plea because an otherwise valid guilty 
plea bars all claims on appeal.66 
Both Brady v. United States and Parker v. North Carolina examined 
charges brought under the Federal Kidnapping Act,67 which at the time al-
lowed a death sentence if a jury recommended such punishment.68  Two 
years prior to Brady and Parker, the death penalty provision of the Federal 
Kidnapping Act was ruled unconstitutional in United States v. Jackson69 
because the death penalty discouraged defendants from asserting their Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination to not plead guilty and 
from asserting their Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury.70  Defendants 
charged under the Act could avoid the death penalty by pleading guilty be-
cause only a jury, not a judge, could sentence the defendant to death.71 
In Brady, the petitioner faced the death penalty and pleaded guilty un-
der the Federal Kidnapping Act at issue in Jackson.72  In light of the Court’s 
recent invalidation of the death penalty provision, Robert Brady claimed his 
pre-Jackson guilty plea was involuntary because it was coerced by the risk 
                                                          
 61.  Id. at 87 n.2.  
 62.  Id.  (“Petitioner’s plea of guilty did not, of course, waive his previous claim of the consti-
tutional privilege.”).  
 63.  McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 775 (1970) (Brennan, J., dissenting).  
 64.  Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 262, 265 (1973) (referring to Brady v. United States, 
397 U.S. 742 (1970), McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970), and Parker v. North Carolina, 
397 U.S. 790 (1970) as the Brady trilogy).  
 65.  Brady, 397 U.S. at 747. 
 66.  Id.  
 67.  18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (2012). 
 68.  Brady, 397 U.S. at 743. 
 69.  390 U.S. 570 (1968). 
 70.  Id. at 581. 
 71.  Id. (noting that the death penalty was “applicable only to those defendants who assert the 
right to contest their guilt before a jury”).  
 72.  Brady, 397 U.S. at 743. 
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of receiving the death penalty.73  The Court emphasized the general rule 
that voluntarily and intelligently entered guilty pleas are valid.74  The Court 
found that even if Brady only pleaded guilty to avoid the death penalty, the 
plea was voluntary nonetheless because a desire to avoid the death penalty 
does not prove that the plea was a coerced and involuntary act.75  Addition-
ally, the Court noted that the plea was intelligent because he was advised by 
a competent attorney under the then-existing law.76  Having established 
Brady’s guilty plea met the validity requirements of the general rule, the 
Court held that his plea was still valid in light of Jackson because a valid 
guilty plea made in consideration of the then-applicable law is not im-
pugned by a defendant not expecting a change in the law.77  Thus, newly 
established law does not affect the validity of a voluntarily and intelligently 
entered guilty plea.78  Brady effectively established that the only way to dis-
turb a judgment of conviction entered pursuant to a guilty plea is to success-
fully claim that the guilty plea was involuntarily or unintelligently en-
tered.79  The Court’s justification lies in its characterization of a guilty plea 
as not merely admitting past conduct, but also as consenting to judgment of 
conviction without a trial.80 
In Parker, Charles Parker faced the death penalty and pleaded guilty 
under a North Carolina first-degree burglary statute.81  The North Carolina 
statutory framework was equivalent to the death penalty provision invali-
dated by the Court in Jackson.82  Parker, like Brady, claimed his plea was 
involuntary in light of the Jackson decision because it was induced by the 
risk of receiving the death penalty.83  The Court conceded that under Jack-
son, it may have been unconstitutional to impose the death penalty under 
the North Carolina statutory framework at the time of Parker’s plea.84  The 
Court, however, reiterated the principle from Brady that an otherwise valid 
plea is not coerced and involuntary simply because a defendant wanted to 
avoid the possibility of the death penalty.85  Finding Parker’s case indistin-
guishable from Brady’s case on this issue, the Court held that Parker’s plea 
                                                          
 73.  Id. at 745–46. 
 74.  Id. at 747. 
 75.  Id. at 750. 
 76.  Id. at 756.  
 77.  Id. at 757 (“The fact that Brady did not anticipate United States v. Jackson . . . does not 
impugn the truth or reliability of his plea.”). 
 78.  Id.  
 79.  Id. at 748.   
 80.  Id.  
 81.  Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 792–93 (1970); see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-162.1 
(1965) (repealed 1971).  
 82.  Parker, 397 U.S. at 794–95.  
 83.  Id.  
 84.  Id.  
 85.  Id. at 795; see supra text accompanying notes 73–75. 
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could not be attacked because it was voluntarily and intelligently entered 
under the then-existing law.86 
In the last case of the Brady trilogy, the Court reinforced its protection 
of guilty pleas in McMann v. Richardson, which involved three defendants 
who confessed and ultimately pleaded guilty to several criminal offenses in 
New York.87  On appeal, each of the defendants claimed their guilty pleas 
were the result of coerced confessions and, therefore, were involuntary and 
invalid.88  The defendants relied on the Court’s decision in Jackson v. Den-
no,89 which held that the New York procedure for determining voluntari-
ness of a confession—the procedure that would have applied to the 
McMann defendants if they decided to go to trial—was unconstitutional.90  
The New York procedure required trial judges, when a defendant offered a 
confession and a prima facie case of voluntariness had been established, to 
submit the issue of voluntariness of a confession to the jury without the 
judge independently resolving factual issues and determining whether the 
confession was voluntary.91  In Denno, the Court held that the procedure 
was unconstitutional because it did not afford a reliable determination of 
voluntariness and did not protect a defendant’s right to be free of conviction 
upon a coerced confession.92 
The decision in Denno was applied retroactively to defendants con-
victed at trial under the New York Procedures in place prior to Denno, 
which granted such defendants an additional hearing on the voluntariness of 
their confession.93  The McMann defendants argued that they were likewise 
entitled to challenge the voluntariness of their confession because their co-
erced confession caused them to plead guilty prior to Denno.94  In rejecting 
the defendants’ claims, the Court drew a distinction between coerced con-
fessions that result in conviction after trial and those that result in a guilty 
plea.95  A conviction after trial in which a coerced confession is introduced 
as evidence rests in part on the coerced confession, which the Court assert-
ed is an unconstitutional basis for conviction.96  When defendants plead 
guilty, however, they are convicted based on their admission that they 
                                                          
 86.  Id. (noting that the Court “see[s] nothing to distinguish Parker’s case from Brady’s” with 
regard to this issue).  
 87.  McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 761–64 (1970).   
 88.  Id.  
 89.  378 U.S. 368 (1964).  
 90.  McMann, 397 U.S. at 765 (noting that prior to Denno, “constitutionally acceptable pro-
cedures were unavailable to a defendant to test the voluntariness of his confession”).  
 91.  Id. at 772. 
 92.  Id.  
 93.  Id. at 773. 
 94.  Id.  
 95.  Id. 
 96.  Id. 
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committed the crime charged in the indictment—any prior coerced confes-
sion is not the basis for the conviction and has never been used as evidence 
in trial.97  The Court held that regardless of the holding reached in Denno, 
the validity of a guilty plea still turns on the voluntary and intelligent nature 
of the plea.98  The validity of a defendant’s plea remains unaffected even if 
the counseled advice would have been different after Denno.99 
The Court reaffirmed its Brady trilogy holdings when it addressed 
whether a guilty plea bars a claim of unconstitutional jury selection on ap-
peal in Tollett v. Henderson.100  In Tollett, the defendant was indicted by a 
grand jury for first-degree murder.101  On the advice of his attorney, the de-
fendant pleaded guilty and was sentenced to ninety-nine years of imprison-
ment.102  The defendant later petitioned for habeas corpus, claiming for the 
first time that his grand jury was unconstitutionally selected because of the 
systematic exclusion of Black Americans from the jury panel.103  The Court 
found the Brady trilogy was controlling because, like each of the defendants 
in the Brady trilogy, the defendant in Tollett alleged a deprivation of a con-
stitutional right that occurred prior to entry of the guilty plea.104  In the 
Brady trilogy, the issue was not the merits of the constitutional claims, but 
whether the pleas were voluntarily and intelligently entered with the advice 
of competent counsel.105  Because the guilty pleas in the Brady trilogy fore-
closed inquiry into the antecedent constitutional violations, the Court found 
that the guilty plea in Tollett likewise foreclosed inquiry into the grand jury 
selection claim.106  The Court held that when a defendant admits guilt of the 
crime charged, they cannot thereafter raise claims concerning the depriva-
tion of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the guilty plea—a defend-
ant may only attack the voluntary and intelligent nature of the plea.107  Tol-
lett’s claim that the grand jury that indicted him was unconstitutionally 
selected was thus barred because it occurred prior to the entry of his guilty 
                                                          
 97.  Id. (“He is convicted on his counseled admission in open court that he committed the 
crime charged against him.  The prior confession is not the basis for the judgment, has never been 
offered in evidence at trial, and may never be offered in evidence.”).  
 98.  Id. at 772. 
 99.  Id. at 773.  
 100.  411 U.S. 258, 266 (1973).  
 101.  Id. at 259. 
 102.  Id. 
 103.  Id.  
 104.  Id. at 265.  In Tollett, the defendant claimed the grand jury that indicted him before he 
pleaded guilty was unconstitutionally selected.  In McMann, each of the defendants claimed their 
prior confessions were coerced.  Lastly, in Brady and Parker, the defendants claimed the death 
penalty provisions of their statutes of conviction placed an impermissible burden on their constitu-
tional rights.  Id. 
 105.  Id. at 266. 
 106.  Id.  The Court reiterated “the principle recognized in the Brady trilogy: a guilty plea rep-
resents a break in the chain of events which has preceded it in the criminal process.”  Id. at 267.  
 107.  Id. at 267.  
 392 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 78:382 
plea.108  The Court’s holding in Tollett, therefore, bolstered and reaffirmed 
the Brady trilogy’s theme of barring post-guilty plea constitutional chal-
lenges. 
C.  The Menna-Blackledge Doctrine: Exceptions to the General Rule 
After Tollett, the Supreme Court shifted away from its practice of 
foreclosing post-guilty plea claims.  The Court carved out two exceptions to 
the general rule that guilty pleas constitute a waiver of all claims on appeal 
in Blackledge v. Perry109 and Menna v. New York.110  The Blackledge-
Menna Court held that claims involving “the right not to be haled into court 
at all”111 and the state’s power to constitutionally prosecute the charge are 
not waived by a guilty plea.112  If the state lacks the power to constitutional-
ly prosecute a defendant, the Court reasoned, the initiation of proceedings 
against them denies the defendant due process of law.113  These exceptions 
are recognized by and imported into Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure.114 
In Blackledge, the Court addressed whether a defendant’s guilty plea 
barred their due process and double jeopardy claims.115  In holding that the 
guilty plea was not a waiver of those claims, the Court ruled that the case at 
bar was distinct from Tollett and the Brady trilogy.116  The Court stated that 
although the claims in Tollett and the Brady trilogy were “of constitutional 
dimensions, none went to the very power of the State to bring the defendant 
into court to answer the charge brought against him.”117  Additionally, un-
like Tollett, the defendant did not complain about a deprivation of constitu-
tional rights that occurred prior to the guilty plea, but rather asserted “the 
right not to be haled into court at all upon the felony charge.”118  Thus, a de-
                                                          
 108.  Id. at 269.  
 109.  417 U.S. 21 (1974).  
 110.  423 U.S. 61 (1975) (per curiam).  
 111.  Blackledge, 417 U.S. at 30. 
 112.  Menna, 423 U.S. at 63 n.2.  
 113.  Blackledge, 417 U.S. at 30–31. 
 114.  See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(a) advisory committee’s notes to 1983 amendments (explaining 
that Rule 11(a)(2) has “no application” to situations like those in Blackledge and Menna where 
claims may be raised after a guilty plea, and that Rule 11(a)(2) “should not be interpreted as either 
broadening or narrowing the Menna-Blackledge doctrine or as establishing procedures for its ap-
plication”).  Rule 11(a)(2) allows a defendant to “enter a conditional plea of guilty . . . reserving in 
writing the right to have an appellate court review an adverse determination of a specified pretrial 
motion.”  FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(a)(2).  
 115.  Blackledge, 417 U.S. at 23. 
 116.  Id. at 30. 
 117.  Id. (explaining the defendants in McMann “could . . . have been brought to trial without 
the use of the . . . coerced confessions” and “a tainted indictment,” like the one in Tollett, “could 
have been ‘cured’ through a new indictment by a properly selected grand jury”). 
 118.  Id. 
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fendant has a right to claim that the state lacked the power to constitutional-
ly prosecute them because a guilty plea is invalid and meaningless if the 
state was without such power.119 
In Menna, the Supreme Court decided whether a guilty plea waived a 
defendant’s right to appeal based on a double jeopardy claim.120  In holding 
that Steve Menna’s claim was not barred, the Court noted neither Tollett, 
Brady, or McMann “stand for the proposition that counseled guilty pleas in-
evitably waive all antecedent constitutional violations.”121  Rather, the point 
was that a valid guilty plea is an admission of factual guilt that removes the 
issue of factual guilt from the case.122  Because the claim in Menna was that 
the State may not convict the defendant “no matter how validly his factual 
guilt is established,” the guilty plea did not bar the claim.123  Even if every-
thing admitted in the indictment is true, the guilty plea is invalid if the state 
lacks the constitutional power to convict the defendant upon the charge in 
the indictment.124 
The Menna-Blackledge doctrine remained untouched by the Supreme 
Court for almost fifteen years until United States v. Broce.125  In Broce, the 
Court addressed another double jeopardy claim, which each defendant made 
after they pleaded guilty to indictments for two separate conspiracies.126  
Though the Court acknowledged the Menna-Blackledge exception to the 
rule prohibiting a collateral attack on a guilty plea, it reasoned that the ex-
ception had no application to the case at bar.127  The Court emphasized that 
Menna added an important qualification to the exception; the rule only ap-
plies when, “judged on its face,” the government may not constitutionally 
prosecute the charge.128  The Court reasoned that the Menna-Blackledge 
doctrine was inapplicable because unlike the defendants in Blackledge and 
Menna, the Broce defendants could not prove their claim without contra-
                                                          
 119.  Id. at 30–31 (noting “[t]he very initiation of the proceedings against [the defendant] in the 
Superior Court thus operated to deny him due process of law”). 
 120.  Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61 (1975) (per curiam). 
 121.  Id. at 62 n.2 (noting in Tollett, the Court emphasized that “waiver was not the basic in-
gredient of [McMann and Brady]”).  
 122.  Id. (“The point of these cases is that a counseled plea of guilty is an admission of factual 
guilt so reliable that, where voluntary and intelligent, it quite validly removes the issue of factual 
guilt from the case.”).  The Court also noted, “[i]n most cases, factual guilt is a sufficient basis for 
the State’s imposition of punishment,” so a guilty plea “simply renders irrelevant those constitu-
tional violations not logically inconsistent with the valid establishment of factual guilt.”  Id.  
 123.  Id.  The Court specified that it “[did] not hold that a double jeopardy claim may never be 
waived.  [The Court] simply [held] that a plea of guilty to a charge does not waive a claim that—
judged on its face—the charge is one which the State may not constitutionally prosecute.”  Id. 
 124.  Id.  
 125.  488 U.S. 563 (1989). 
 126.  Id. at 565.  
 127.  Id. at 574.  
 128.  Id. at 575. (citing Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 63 n.2 (1975) (per curiam) (empha-
sis added)). 
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dicting their indictments and venturing beyond the existing record.129  
Broce thus expressly narrowed the Menna-Blackledge exception by recog-
nizing that Menna impliedly required that the claim must be proved by rely-
ing on the existing record.130 
D.  Development of the Law in the Federal Circuits and the Circuit 
Split 
Following Blackledge, Menna, and Broce, an inconsistent application 
of the law resulted in a federal circuit split.  The United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Sixth, Fifth, and Eighth Circuit differ from the United States 
Court of Appeals for the D.C. and Tenth Circuit in their application of 
Broce’s holding to the Menna-Blackledge doctrine.131  More significantly, 
absent any guidance from the Supreme Court since Broce, most circuits 
have developed an analysis distinct from that of the Supreme Court for de-
termining whether a guilty plea bars a certain claim on appeal.  In the Unit-
ed States Court of Appeals for the Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, 
Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuit, an important distinction is 
made between jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional claims.132  Of these cir-
cuits, all but the Third, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuit further distinguish be-
tween facial and as-applied constitutional challenges in determining wheth-
er a claim is jurisdictional, but not all of the circuits are in agreement on 
that issue.133 
1.  The Inconsistent Application of Broce 
The Sixth, Fifth, and Eighth Circuit have relied on the Menna-
Blackledge doctrine either without mentioning Broce or have treated 
Broce’s holding as equivalent to the Menna-Blackledge doctrine.  For ex-
ample, in United States v. Skinner,134 the Sixth Circuit cited Blackledge as 
its sole support for holding that a guilty plea did not bar the defendant’s 
claim that the statute of conviction was unconstitutionally vague.135  Like-
wise, in United States v. Knowles,136 the Fifth Circuit held that a claim that 
                                                          
 129.  Id. at 575–76 (explaining “[i]n Blackledge, the concessions implicit in the defendant’s 
guilty plea were simply irrelevant, because the constitutional infirmity in the proceedings lay in 
the State’s power to bring any indictment at all,” and in Menna, “the indictment was facially du-
plicative of the earlier offense . . . so that the admissions made by Menna’s guilty plea could not 
conceivably be construed to extend beyond a redundant confession to the earlier offense”).  
 130.  Id.  
 131.  See infra Section II.D.1.  
 132.  See infra Section II.D.2.  
 133.  See infra Section II.D.3. 
 134.  25 F.3d 1314 (6th Cir. 1994). 
 135.  Id. at 1317 (“[F]ollowing a guilty plea, a defendant [can] raise on appeal that he was 
prosecuted under an unconstitutional statute.” (citing Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974))). 
 136.  29 F.3d 947 (5th Cir. 1994).  
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the statute of conviction was unconstitutional was not barred pursuant to 
Menna.137  In United States v. Seay,138 the Eighth Circuit acknowledged 
Broce’s existence in its analysis but treated Broce as equivalent to the Men-
na-Blackledge doctrine by only citing to Broce in conjunction with Black-
ledge and Menna.139  Each of these circuits did not consider the limitation 
that Broce placed on the Menna-Blackledge doctrine in their analyses.140 
In contrast, the D.C. and Tenth Circuit expressly base their holdings on 
the limitation that Broce placed on the Menna-Blackledge doctrine.  In 
United States v. Delgado-Garcia,141 the D.C. Circuit held that the Menna-
Blackledge exception did not apply to Jose Delgado-Garcia’s claim.142  Cit-
ing Broce, the court determined that there was no facial constitutional de-
fect in the indictment.143  The claim was thus barred because an assessment 
of Delgado-Garcia’s claim would have required the court to look beyond 
the facts in the indictment.144  The Tenth Circuit used Broce to establish a 
much more narrow view of the Menna-Blackledge doctrine in United States 
v. De Vaughn.145  In De Vaughn, the court explained that Blackledge and 
Menna created exceptions for two types of claims: “claims that the Due 
Process Clause prevents the state from bringing a greater charge and claims 
that an indictment is ‘facially duplicative of [an] earlier offense.’”146  Based 
on this interpretation of Broce, the court held that a claim that the statute of 
conviction is unconstitutional does not fall within the Menna-Blackledge 
exception and is foreclosed by a guilty plea.147  
2.  Jurisdictional and Non-Jurisdictional Claims 
The Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, Elev-
enth, and D.C. Circuit distinguish between jurisdictional and non-
                                                          
 137.  Id. at 952 (“[It is well-established] that a guilty plea does not waive the right of the de-
fendant to challenge the constitutionality of the statute under which he is convicted.” (citing Men-
na v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62–63 n.2 (1975) (per curiam)). 
 138.  620 F.3d 919 (8th Cir. 2010).  
 139.  Id. at 921, 923 (“[Seay] alleges that the indictment should never have been brought at all 
because the government ‘may not constitutionally prosecute’ him.  If Seay is correct, then he 
should never have been ‘haled into court’ at all . . . .  Such challenges to the court’s jurisdiction 
may be pursued despite a defendant’s guilty plea.” (first quoting Menna, 423 U.S. at 62 n.2; then 
quoting Blackledge, 417 U.S. at 30; then citing United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 575 
(1989))). 
 140.  See supra text accompanying notes 129–130.  
 141.  374 F.3d 1337 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 
 142.  Id. at 1343.   
 143.  Id.  
 144.  Id.  
 145.  694 F.3d 1141 (10th Cir. 2012).  
 146.  Id. at 1152 (quoting Broce, 488 U.S. at 575). 
 147.  Id. at 1154 (“Neither Blackledge nor Menna involved claims that a criminal statute vio-
lated the Constitution.  Rather, the defendants in those cases alleged that bringing any charges, 
even charges based on valid statutes, violated due process or double jeopardy.”).  
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jurisdictional claims when assessing the validity of a claim on appeal.  “The 
term ‘jurisdictional’ refers to a court’s statutory or constitutional authority 
to hale the defendant into court.”148  Supreme Court jurisprudence, howev-
er, makes no reference to the jurisdictional nature of a post-guilty plea 
claim.149  The general rule in the above-mentioned circuits is that a guilty 
plea waives the right to appeal all non-jurisdictional issues, including con-
stitutional claims.150  Thus, a defendant who pleads guilty may only bring 
jurisdictional claims on appeal.151   
To illustrate, in Skinner, Rodney Skinner pleaded guilty to possession 
and distribution of obscene matter and later appealed, claiming that the stat-
ute of conviction was unconstitutionally vague.152  After reiterating the gen-
eral rule that a guilty plea waives all non-jurisdictional defects, the Sixth 
Circuit asserted that a vagueness challenge is a jurisdictional defect because 
it challenges the government’s authority to constitutionally prosecute a de-
fendant under the statute.153  As a result, Skinner’s guilty plea did not fore-
close his vagueness challenge.154 
In United States v. Whited,155 Ruth Whited pleaded guilty to embez-
zling money from a healthcare provider.156  On appeal, the defendant 
claimed the indictment was insufficient, the court lacked subject matter ju-
risdiction, and the statute of conviction was unconstitutional as-applied to 
her.157  The Third Circuit concluded that each of Whited’s claims chal-
lenged the court’s jurisdiction and were not barred because she could not be 
constitutionally prosecuted if any of her claims were true.158 
In United States v. Brown,159 Bud Ray Brown pleaded guilty to at-
tempted escape from a county jail and appealed, claiming lack of jurisdic-
tion on the basis that he was not in federal custody at the time of the at-
tempt.160  After stating the general rule that a guilty plea does not bar 
                                                          
 148.  United States v. Phillips, 645 F.3d 859, 862 (7th Cir. 2011) (“A jurisdictional issue is one 
that stands in the way of conviction—even when factual guilt is validly established—and prevents 
a court from entering any judgment in the case . . . .”). 
 149.  See De Vaughn, 694 F.3d at 1152 (recognizing the Supreme Court does not “speak in 
terms of jurisdiction”); see also supra Section II.A–C (discussing Supreme Court cases that 
demonstrate the Court does not base its decisions on the jurisdictional nature of claims). 
 150.  Phillips, 645 F.3d at 862 (“As a general rule, a defendant who pleads guilty waives his 
right to appeal all non-jurisdictional issues.”).  
 151.  Id.  
 152.  United States v. Skinner, 25 F.3d 1314, 1315 (6th Cir. 1994). 
 153.  Id. at 1317 (“Although a guilty plea waives all non-jurisdictional defects . . . a vagueness 
challenge is a jurisdictional defect.”). 
 154.  Id.  
 155.  311 F.3d 259 (3d Cir. 2002). 
 156.  Id. at 260. 
 157.  Id. at 262. 
 158.  Id. 
 159.  875 F.3d 1235 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 160.  Id. at 1237, 1238. 
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jurisdictional claims, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that Brown’s claim was not 
barred because a claim involving the legal status of custody challenges the 
government’s jurisdiction.161 
Likewise, in United States v. Saac,162 four defendants pleaded guilty to 
knowingly conspiring to operate and intentionally “operating and embark-
ing in a semi-submersible vessel without nationality, with the intent to 
evade detection in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2285(a) and (b).”163  The de-
fendants claimed that their statute of conviction was unconstitutional.164  
The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the defendants’ challenge was a juris-
dictional issue not waived upon pleading guilty because even if the defend-
ants were factually guilty, the government would lack the power to prose-
cute them if the statute of conviction was unconstitutional.165   
3.  Facial and As-Applied Constitutional Challenges 
Apart from the Third, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuit, the federal circuits 
that speak in terms of jurisdiction further distinguish between facial and as-
applied constitutional challenges to determine whether a claim is waived on 
appeal.  Supreme Court jurisprudence, however, does not make any such 
distinction.166  The general rule in this group of circuits is that a guilty plea 
waives the right to bring an as-applied constitutional challenge because it is 
a non-jurisdictional claim, but a defendant can bring a facial constitutional 
challenge because it is jurisdictional.167  
In United States v. Phillips,168 Michael Phillips pleaded guilty to ille-
gal removal and disposal of asbestos.169  For the first time on appeal, the de-
fendant claimed that the statute was unconstitutionally vague as applied to 
him.170  The Seventh Circuit began its analysis with the general rule that a 
post-guilty plea defendant waives the right to appeal all non-jurisdictional 
claims and then stated that an as-applied challenge is not jurisdictional.171  
The court reasoned that a facially vague statute is jurisdictional because it is 
                                                          
 161.  Id. at 1238–39 (“Brown’s claim involving the legal status of his custody challenges the 
government’s power to bring the indictment ‘at the time the plea was entered on the basis of the 
existing record.’” (quoting United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 575 (1989))). 
 162.  632 F.3d 1203 (11th Cir. 2011). 
 163.  Id. at 1207. 
 164.  Id. 
 165.  Id. at 1208. 
 166.  See supra Section II.A–C (discussing Supreme Court cases that illustrate the lack of a 
distinction between facial and as-applied challenges). 
 167.  United States v. Phillips, 645 F.3d 859, 863 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[W]hile a facial vagueness 
challenge is jurisdictional, an as-applied vagueness challenge is non-jurisdictional and waived un-
less specifically reserved for appeal in a conditional plea agreement.”).  
 168.  645 F.3d 859 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 169.  Id. at 860. 
 170.  Id. at 861.  
 171.  Id. at 862–63. 
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vague in every application, which prevents a court from entering judgment 
and obtaining a conviction under the statute.172  By contrast, an as-applied 
challenge only disputes the court’s ability to enter judgment and obtain a 
conviction in the single case before it.173  Even if the as-applied challenge is 
successful, a court is not left without the power to bring other defendants 
into court under the statute.174  Thus, Phillips’s guilty plea barred him from 
bringing an as-applied challenge on appeal.175 
In United States v. Seay,176 Andrew Seay pleaded guilty to possession 
of a firearm while unlawfully using a controlled substance.177  The defend-
ant appealed, claiming that the statute of conviction was facially unconstitu-
tional.178  The Eighth Circuit determined that a facial challenge is a jurisdic-
tional claim because a court would not have the power to bring a defendant 
into court under the statute.179  Pursuant to the court’s holding, Seay was 
permitted to bring his facial challenge.  The analyses and general holdings 
of the Fifth, Sixth, and Tenth Circuit are consistent with the above holdings 
in Phillips and Seay, each maintaining that a facial constitutional challenge 
is a jurisdictional defect not barred by a guilty plea.180  Together, these cir-
cuits compose the majority rule in the federal circuits.  
The D.C. Circuit and the Second Circuit, however, disagree with the 
other federal circuits about the general rule that a facial constitutional chal-
lenge is not waived because it is a jurisdictional challenge.  In United States 
v. Baucum,181 Patrick Baucum pleaded guilty to distribution of cocaine 
within 1,000 feet of a school and then raised for the first time on appeal a 
facial challenge to the constitutionality of the criminal statute.182  The D.C. 
Circuit recognized that several federal courts have treated facial constitu-
tional claims as jurisdictional.183  The court reasoned that even if the power 
                                                          
 172.  Id. at 863.  
 173.  Id. (“[A] statute that is vague only as-applied to the defendant may still be constitutional 
as-applied to others, and it thus does not strip the court of its power to enter a judgment under the 
statute.”). 
 174.  Id.  
 175.  Id.  
 176.  620 F.3d 919 (8th Cir. 2010). 
 177.  Id. at 920.  
 178.  Id. at 922.  
 179.  Id. at 923 (noting a facial challenge is a claim the government cannot constitutionally 
prosecute the defendant under the statute).  
 180.  See United States v. De Vaughn, 694 F.3d 1141, 1154 (10th Cir. 2012) (reasoning that 
the defendant’s as-applied First Amendment challenge was barred by his guilty plea); United 
States v. Urquilla-Avalos, 144 F. App’x 447, 447–48 (5th Cir. 2005) (asserting that a guilty plea 
waives all non-jurisdictional defects and bars an as-applied constitutional challenge, but does not 
waive a facial constitutional challenge); United States v. Skinner, 25 F.3d 1314, 1317 (6th Cir. 
1994) (holding that a facial vagueness challenge is a jurisdictional defect).  
 181.  80 F.3d 539 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (per curiam). 
 182.  Id. at 540. 
 183.  Id. at 542.  
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to bring a defendant into court upon a charge does involve an issue of juris-
diction, “it does not follow that any facial constitutional challenge is also 
jurisdictional.”184  The court ultimately concluded that facial constitutional 
challenges to presumptively valid statutes are non-jurisdictional and barred 
by a guilty plea if the claims are raised for the first time on appeal.185  The 
court justified its holding with policy considerations of judicial efficiency 
and finality of convictions.186   
Similarly, in United States v. Drew,187 Wilbert Drew pleaded guilty to 
possession of a firearm and claimed for the first time on appeal that the 
statute of conviction was facially unconstitutional.188  Relying on Baucum, 
the D.C. Circuit held that Drew’s facial challenge was barred because he 
failed to raise the challenge in the lower court.189  The Second Circuit took 
lead from the D.C. Circuit in United States v. Feliciano190 and held that 
pursuant to Baucum, the defendants waived their facial constitutional chal-
lenges by failing to raise them in the court below.191 
The Third, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuit, by contrast, do not make any 
meaningful distinction between facial and as-applied challenges.  In United 
States v. Manna,192 Dahelak Manna pleaded guilty and brought an as-
applied challenge to his statute of conviction.193  The Third Circuit noted, 
without emphasis, the as-applied nature of his claim and determined that his 
guilty plea did not bar his as-applied challenge.194  Permitting an as-applied 
challenge in this context is contrary to the general rule among the federal 
circuits that an as-applied challenge is waived by a guilty plea because it is 
a non-jurisdictional claim.195  Similarly, in United States v. Sandsness,196 
Michael Sandsness pleaded guilty to selling drug paraphernalia in interstate 
commerce.197  On appeal, Sandsness brought both facial and as-applied 
                                                          
 184.  Id. at 543.  
 185.  Id. at 540. 
 186.  Id. at 544. 
 187.  200 F.3d 871 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
 188.  Id. at 874. 
 189.  Id. at 876. 
 190.  223 F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 191.  Id. at 125 (“There is no reason why [the defendant’s] constitutional challenges could not 
have been raised below, where he had ample opportunity to raise them and where the district court 
would have had the opportunity to address them.”). 
 192.  92 F. App’x 880 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 193.  Id. at 884. 
 194.  Id. at 886, 886 n.6 (“Manna’s guilty plea does not foreclose his constitutional challenge 
because the issue of a statute’s constitutionality ‘goes to the jurisdiction of the district court.’” 
(quoting United States v. Bishop, 66 F.3d 569, 572 n.1 (3d Cir. 1995))); see also United States v. 
Whited, 311 F.3d 259, 262 (3d Cir. 2002) (concluding that a guilty plea did not bar the defend-
ant’s claims without stamping any significance on the as-applied nature of one of the claims). 
 195.  See supra note 167 and accompanying text. 
 196.  988 F.2d 970 (9th Cir. 1992).  
 197.  Id. at 970. 
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challenges to the statute of conviction.198  Before reaching the merits of his 
claims, the Ninth Circuit determined the guilty plea did not bar either of 
Sandsness’s claims because both facial and as-applied constitutional chal-
lenges are jurisdictional and thus not waived by a guilty plea.199  Lastly, in 
Saac, four defendants brought a facial challenge to their statute of convic-
tion.200  The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the defendants’ claim was not 
barred because it was a jurisdictional challenge without any mention of 
whether it was a facial or as-applied challenge.201 
The above discussion about the post-Broce development in the federal 
circuits illustrates that the law regarding the preclusive effect of guilty pleas 
is far from settled.  Although there is some uniformity among the circuits 
that consistently hold that a guilty plea is a waiver of all non-jurisdictional 
claims,202 there is still much variation in how the circuits apply Broce, in-
terpret the breadth of the Menna-Blackledge exception, and distinguish be-
tween facial and as-applied challenges. 
III.  THE COURT’S REASONING 
In Class v. United States, the Supreme Court directly addressed 
“whether a guilty plea by itself bars a federal criminal defendant from chal-
lenging the constitutionality of the statute of conviction on direct appeal.”203  
Writing for the majority, Justice Breyer stated a guilty plea does not bar a 
claim that the statute is unconstitutional because it challenges the govern-
ment’s power to constitutionally prosecute the defendant.204  The Court be-
gan by noting that in Haynes v. United States, it held that a guilty plea does 
not bar a constitutional claim, and that subsequent Supreme Court decisions 
have offered a rationale for Haynes’s holding that applies to Class’s 
claims.205 
The Court first discussed its holdings in Blackledge and Menna to il-
lustrate that not all constitutional claims are barred by a guilty plea.206  The 
Court explained that the constitutional claim in Blackledge was not pre-
cluded because it implicated the power of the state to prosecute the defend-
                                                          
 198.  Id.  
 199.  Id. at 971 (“While a guilty plea waives all nonjurisdictional defects and fact issues, it 
does not bar constitutional challenges.”). 
 200.  United States v. Saac, 632 F.3d 1203, 1207 (11th Cir. 2011). 
 201.  Id. at 1208; see supra notes 162–165 and accompanying text.  
 202.  See supra Section II.D.2. 
 203.  138 S. Ct. 798, 803 (2018). 
 204.  Id. at 805 (citing United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 575 (1989)).  
 205.  Id. at 803; see also supra notes 60–62 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme 
Court’s holding in Haynes).  
 206.  Class, 138 S. Ct. at 803–04. 
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ant and asserted the right not to be brought into court upon the charge.207  
Observing that Menna repeated the holding and reasoning in Blackledge, 
the Court restated its holding in Menna: A guilty plea does not waive a 
claim that, “judged on its face,” the state cannot constitutionally prosecute 
the charge.208  The Court described the claim in Menna as a claim that the 
state may not constitutionally convict the defendant even if factual guilt is 
validly established.209 
After discussing the Menna-Blackledge doctrine, the Court found sup-
port for those holdings in early guilty plea jurisprudence.210  According to 
the Court, the holdings in Menna and Blackledge “reflect an understanding 
of the nature of guilty pleas which, in broad outline, stretches back nearly 
150 years.”211  The Court pointed to several early state and federal cases 
that held that a guilty plea did not waive constitutional claims or defective 
indictment claims.212 
The Court noted it had “reaffirmed” and “refined [the] scope” of the 
Menna-Blackledge doctrine in Broce.213  The Court explained that the 
Broce Court repeated the holdings of Blackledge and Menna but added that 
a guilty plea waives a claim that cannot be proven without relying on the 
existing record and without contradicting the indictment.214  The Court dis-
tinguished Class’s claims from the claim in Broce.215  Unlike Broce, Class’s 
constitutional claims did not contradict the indictment or plea agreement.216  
The Court asserted that Class’s Second Amendment and due process claims 
were consistent with his admission of the allegations in the indictment and 
could be resolved without looking at evidence beyond the existing rec-
ord.217   
Additionally, the Court distinguished Class’s claims from the uncon-
stitutional grand jury selection claim the Court faced in Tollett v. Hender-
son, reasoning that Class’s claims did not allege constitutional deprivations 
                                                          
 207.  Id. at 803 (noting the right accepted by the Court is the right not to be haled into court at 
all upon the charge because “[t]he very initiation of the proceedings” against the defendant “oper-
ated to deprive him due process of law” (citing Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 30–31 (1974))). 
 208.  Id. at 803–04 (citing Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62 n.2 (1975) (per curiam)). 
 209.  Id. at 804 (citing Menna, 423 U.S. at 62 n.2). 
 210.  Id. 
 211.  Id. (noting in 1869, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that “if the facts 
alleged and admitted do not constitute a crime against the laws of the Commonwealth, the defend-
ant is entitled to be discharged” (quoting Commonwealth v. Hinds, 101 Mass. 209, 210 (1869))). 
 212.  Id.; see supra Section II.A (discussing the early guilty plea cases mentioned by the Court 
in this part of the opinion). 
 213.  Class, 138 S. Ct. at 804.  
 214.  Id. (citing United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 576 (1974)). 
 215.  Id. 
 216.  Id. 
 217.  Id. (quoting Broce, 488 U.S. at 575). 
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that occurred prior to entering his guilty plea.218  The Court explained that 
unlike the claim in Tollett, Class’s claims could not be “‘cured’ through a 
new indictment by a properly selected grand jury.”219  The grand jury selec-
tion claim in Tollett was irrelevant to the validity of the conviction because 
the defendant’s guilty plea admitted charges that constituted a crime.220  
Class’s guilty plea, however, did not render his claims irrelevant because he 
asserted that the admitted conduct did not constitute a crime, which affected 
the validity of Class’s conviction.221  The Court ultimately held that a guilty 
plea did not bar Class’s claims because it was not prohibited by his plea 
agreement, and, like those made in Blackledge and Menna, Class’s claims 
challenged the government’s power to constitutionally prosecute him.222 
The Court rejected each of the three arguments that the government 
raised in support of its position that Class’s guilty plea barred his claims on 
appeal.223  First, the Court rejected the government’s contention that Class 
“inherently relinquished his constitutional claims” by pleading guilty, de-
termining that Class’s claims fell under the Menna-Blackledge doctrine.224  
Second, the Court rejected the argument that Rule 11(a)(2)225 precludes a 
defendant from bringing a claim that he failed to reserve in writing because 
“the Rule itself does not say whether it sets forth the exclusive procedure for 
a defendant to preserve a constitutional claim.”226  Moreover, the Court rec-
ognized that the Rule is not applicable to claims that fall under the Menna-
Blackledge doctrine because the advisory committee notes expressly declare 
Rule 11(a)(2) inapplicable to claims raised under the Menna-Blackledge 
doctrine.227  Lastly, the Court rejected the claim that Class expressly waived 
his right to appeal when Class agreed to the district court judge’s verbal 
statement that he was giving up his right to appeal his conviction.228  The 
Court reasoned that the statement was made to ensure that Class understood 
the terms of his plea agreement and did not expressly refer to a waiver of 
the right to appeal at issue.229 
                                                          
 218.  Id. at 804–05 (quoting Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 30 (1974)).  
 219.  Id. at 805 (quoting Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973)).  
 220.  Id.  
 221.  Id.  
 222.  Id.  
 223.  Id.  
 224.  Id. at 805–06 (“[L]ike the defendants in Blackledge and Menna, [Class] seeks to raise a 
claim which, ‘judged on its face’ based upon the existing record, would extinguish the govern-
ment’s power to ‘constitutionally prosecute’ the defendant if the claim were successful.” (quoting 
Broce, 488 U.S. at 575)).  
 225.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(a)(2); see supra note 30 and accompanying text.  
 226.  Class, 138 S. Ct. at 806. 
 227.  Id.; see FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(a) advisory committee’s notes to 1983 amendments (recog-
nizing the Rule does not apply to claims that fall within the Menna-Blackledge doctrine). 
 228.  Class, 138 S. Ct. at 807; see supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
 229.  Id.  
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In his dissent, Justice Alito, joined by Justice Thomas and Justice 
Kennedy, argued that the majority was incorrect because Rule 11 should 
have governed Class’s claims and criticized the majority’s decision for 
leaving the law in a disordered state.230  Contrary to the majority’s holding, 
Justice Alito determined that Rule 11 clearly states, with one exception, an 
unconditional guilty plea is a waiver of all non-jurisdictional claims.231  
Although not exactly stated in the Rule, Justice Alito reasoned that a waiver 
of all non-jurisdictional claims is implied by the text of the Rule and the 
advisory committee’s notes state that an unconditional plea waives all non-
jurisdictional defects.232  The exception that Justice Alito referred to is the 
Menna-Blackledge doctrine.233  Although Justice Alito recognized that Rule 
11(a)(2) is not applicable to the Menna-Blackledge doctrine, he viewed 
Blackledge and Menna as “marked departures” from the Court’s prior deci-
sions.234  Justice Alito criticized the holdings of Blackledge and Menna at 
length, claiming that the Menna-Blackledge doctrine “is vacuous, has no 
sound foundation, and produces nothing but confusion.”235 
Justice Alito declared that Broce “essentially repudiated” the theories 
offered in Blackledge and Menna.236  According to Justice Alito, Broce ex-
plicitly disavowed Menna’s proposition that a guilty plea admits only factu-
al guilt by explaining that an unconditional plea admits “all of the factual 
and legal elements” necessary to obtain a binding conviction.237  Regarding 
Blackledge, Justice Alito reasoned that Broce rejected the idea that a right 
not to be tried survives a guilty plea by holding that the defendants’ right to 
bring a double jeopardy claim was eliminated by their guilty pleas.238 
Justice Alito asserted that instead of clarifying the law, the majority’s 
opinion added confusion by reiterating unintelligible catchphrases from 
Blackledge without adding any clarity to their meaning.239  Justice Alito al-
so criticized the majority for repeating Menna’s proposition that only 
claims which contradict the allegations in the indictment are waived by a 
guilty plea.240  Justice Alito claimed such a holding would allow defendants 
to raise “an uncertain assortment of claims never before thought to survive a 
                                                          
 230.  Id. at 807, 816 (Alito, J., dissenting).  
 231.  Id. at 808. 
 232.  Id. (citing FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(a) advisory committee’s notes to 1983 amendments). 
 233.  Id. at 809. 
 234.  Id.  
 235.  Id. at 816. 
 236.  Id. at 813.  
 237.  Id. (quoting United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 569 (1989)); see Broce, 488 U.S. at 
570 (“By entering a plea of guilty, the accused is not simply stating that he did the discrete acts 
described in the indictment; he is admitting guilt of a substantive crime.”).  
 238.  Class, 138 S. Ct. at 813 (Alito, J., dissenting).  
 239.  Id. at 814. 
 240.  Id.  
 404 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 78:382 
guilty plea.”241  Finally, Justice Alito declared that the majority incorrectly 
sought support for its opinion in early guilty plea jurisprudence.242  Justice 
Alito characterized Haynes as “irrelevant for present purposes” because the 
government did not argue that the defendant’s plea barred his constitutional 
claim.243  Likewise, Justice Alito stated that Commonwealth v. Hinds was 
unhelpful to the resolution of this case because it only reflects the idea that 
a post-guilty plea defendant can assert jurisdictional defects.244  Justice 
Alito concluded his dissent by reiterating his belief that Rule 11 governed 
Class’s case and noted he would have limited the Menna-Blackledge doc-
trine “to the particular types of claims involved in those cases.”245 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
In Class v. United States, the Supreme Court held that a guilty plea 
does not bar a federal criminal defendant from challenging the constitution-
ality of the statute of conviction because such a claim does not contradict a 
defendant’s admissions and challenges the government’s power to constitu-
tionally prosecute them.246  The Court’s holding was ultimately correct be-
cause the Menna-Blackledge doctrine applied to Class’s claims and its hold-
ing is consistent with Broce: Class’s claims challenged the government’s 
power to constitutionally convict him, his claims do not contradict the con-
duct admitted in his guilty plea, and it is not necessary to venture beyond 
the existing record to prove his claims.247  The Court’s holding is also com-
patible with the text of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
because nothing in the Rule indicates that a constitutional challenge is 
waived if it is not reserved through a conditional plea.248  Additionally, the 
holding was appropriate because Rule 11(a)(2)’s extension of the right to 
enter a conditional plea does not sufficiently protect the procedural right of 
post-guilty plea defendants to bring constitutional claims.249  Further, the 
Court properly balanced the government’s interest in the finality of guilty 
pleas and the conservation of judicial resources with defendants’ interest in 
asserting certain values protected by the constitution and in being free from 
unjustified punishment.250  The Court’s reasoning was flawed, however, be-
                                                          
 241.  Id.   
 242.  Id. at 815. 
 243.  Id. (explaining how allowing a constitutional claim when the government does not assert 
the plea as a bar does not provide any insight about what should happen when the government, 
like in Class, does argue the guilty plea bars the constitutional claim).  
 244.  Id.  
 245.  Id. at 816. 
 246.  Id. at 804–05 (majority opinion). 
 247.  See infra Section IV.A. 
 248.  See infra Section IV.B. 
 249.  See infra Section IV.C. 
 250.  See infra Section IV.D. 
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cause the Court neglected to discuss the distinction between jurisdictional 
and non-jurisdictional claims and facial and as-applied constitutional chal-
lenges.251  As a result, the Court failed to generally clarify the law and did 
not utilize this opportunity to promote uniformity in the federal circuits.252   
A.  The Court’s Holding Is Correct Because the Menna-Blackledge 
Doctrine Is Applicable to Class’s Claim and Is Consistent with 
Broce 
The Court’s conclusion that the Menna-Blackledge doctrine applies to 
a criminal defendant’s constitutional challenge to their statute of conviction 
was correct.253  Similar to the claims in Blackledge and Menna, Class’s 
claim that his statute of conviction was unconstitutional challenges the gov-
ernment’s authority to constitutionally prosecute him.254  A guilty plea does 
not constitute a concession that the state may constitutionally proscribe 
conduct alleged in the indictment.255  Rather, a guilty plea establishes factu-
al guilt—that the defendant did, in fact, engage in the conduct alleged in the 
indictment.256  If a statute is found unconstitutional, the state may not con-
stitutionally prosecute the defendant because the admitted conduct is non-
criminal, meaning the defendant essentially pleaded guilty to no crime at 
all.257  The Menna-Blackledge doctrine thus applies to Class’s claim be-
cause, if his claim is successful, the government cannot constitutionally 
prosecute Class for innocent conduct. 
The Court’s holding is also consistent with its holding in Broce.258  
Broce reaffirmed and placed limitations on the Menna-Blackledge doctrine 
by expressly requiring that defendants must be able to prove their claim by 
relying on the existing record and without contradicting the conduct alleged 
and admitted in the indictment.259  The Broce Court found that the Menna-
                                                          
 251.  See infra Section IV.E. 
 252.  See infra Section IV.E.  
 253.  Class v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 798, 805 (2018).   
 254.  Id. 
 255.  Hannah Roberts, Comment, Rethinking the Effects of a Guilty Plea on the Right to Chal-
lenge One’s Statute of Conviction, 26 AM U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 623, 631 (2017). 
 256.  Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62 n.2 (1975) (per curiam).  
 257.  See United States v. Seay, 620 F.3d 919, 923 (8th Cir. 2010) (holding that Seay’s claim 
that the statute of conviction was facially unconstitutional under the Second Amendment was not 
barred by his guilty plea because, if correct, the government had no power to bring him into court 
at all); Journigan v. Duffy, 552 F.2d 283, 289 (9th Cir. 1977) (holding that Journigan’s claim that 
the statute of conviction was unconstitutional was not barred by his guilty plea because such a 
claim “goes to the very authority of the state to hale him into court”); see also Roberts, supra note 
255, at 631 (“If it is determined upon review that the state has no authority to punish that conduct, 
the defendant is essentially innocent of wrongdoing, regardless of the plea she entered.”).  
 258.  See supra notes 125–130 and accompanying text (discussing Broce’s holding). 
 259.  See United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 574–75 (1988) (recognizing Blackledge and 
Menna established “[a]n exception to the rule barring collateral attack on a guilty plea” but finding 
the exception was not applicable to the case at bar); United States v. De Vaughn, 694 F.3d 1141, 
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Blackledge doctrine was not applicable because the defendants’ claim could 
not be proved without contradicting the indictments and venturing beyond 
the existing record.260  The Broce defendants pleaded guilty to two separate 
conspiracy indictments, then later claimed that only one conspiracy exist-
ed.261  Such an assertion directly contradicts the charges in the indictment 
that the defendants admitted and necessarily involves relying on infor-
mation other than the existing record.  Unlike the claim in Broce, Class’s 
claims that the statute of conviction was unconstitutional did not deny that 
he engaged in the alleged and admitted conduct.262  Class maintained that 
he engaged in the alleged conduct and simply claimed that the government 
may not constitutionally convict him based on such conduct.263  Class’s 
claims, therefore, are distinct from the claim in Broce and are wholly con-
sistent with the limitations that Broce placed on the Menna-Blackledge ex-
ception.  
B.  The Court’s Holding Is Compatible with Rule 11 
The Court’s holding is compatible with Rule 11 as well.  Although 
Rule 11(a)(2) allows defendants to preserve certain rights on appeal by en-
tering a conditional plea,264 nothing in the text of the Rule suggests that 
challenges to a statute’s constitutionality are waived if not reserved by a 
conditional plea.265  Moreover, Rule 11(b)(1),266 which sets forth the factors 
                                                          
1151 (10th Cir. 2012) (noting the Supreme Court “imposed some limits on Blackledge and Men-
na” in Broce); Daniel P. Blank, Plea Bargain Waivers Reconsidered: A Legal Pragmatist’s Guide 
to Loss, Abandonment and Alienation, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 2011, 2028 (2000) (“Endeavoring to 
cabin the decisions in Blackledge and Menna without overruling them, the Court in Broce recog-
nized a limited jurisdictional exception to the general rule against collateral challenges ‘where on 
the face of the record the court had no power to enter the conviction or impose the sentence,’ but 
found it inapplicable to claims of double jeopardy.” (quoting Broce, 488 U.S. at 569)). Contra 
Class v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 798, 813 (2018) (Alito, J., dissenting) (claiming Broce “repudi-
ated the theories offered” in Blackledge and Menna). 
 260.  Broce, 488 U.S. at 575–76 (noting Blackledge and Menna were resolved without any 
need to venture beyond the existing record).  In Blackledge, the concessions implicit in the de-
fendant’s guilty plea were irrelevant because the constitutional infirmity in the proceedings lay in 
the State’s power to bring any indictment at all.  Id.  In Menna, the indictment was facially dupli-
cative of the earlier offense of which the defendant had been convicted and sentenced, so the ad-
missions made by Menna’s guilty plea could not conceivably be construed to extend beyond a 
redundant confession to the earlier offense.  Id.  
 261.  Id. at 565.  
 262.  Class, 138 S. Ct. at 805. 
 263.  Id. at 805–06 (“[Class] seeks to raise a claim which, ‘judged on its face’ based upon the 
existing record, would extinguish the government’s power to ‘constitutionally prosecute’ the de-
fendant if the claim were successful.” (quoting Broce, 488 U.S. at 575)).  
 264.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(a)(2).  
 265.  Brief for The National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. as Amici Curiae 
In Support of Petitioner at 20, Class v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 798 (2018) (No. 16-424) [herein-
after Brief for National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers]; see Class, 138 S. Ct. at 806 
(stating that “the Rule itself does not say whether it sets forth the exclusive procedure for a de-
fendant to preserve a constitutional claim”). 
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that courts must convey to defendants before they enter a guilty plea, does 
not clearly state that by accepting a guilty plea a defendant waives the right 
to challenge the constitutionality of the statute of conviction.267  As a result, 
issues regarding the intelligent nature of guilty pleas could arise if Rule 11 
was interpreted as barring claims that challenge the constitutionality of the 
statute of conviction.268  Because Rule 11 does not require the court to ex-
plicitly notify defendants that their guilty plea waives the right to challenge 
the constitutionality of the statute, the plea may not be intelligently made 
for purposes of waiving that right.269 
C.  The Court’s Holding Is Correct Because Rule 11(a)(2) Provides 
Inadequate Protection of Defendants’ Procedural Rights 
The opportunity for defendants to enter into conditional guilty pleas 
pursuant to Rule 11(a)(2) does not function as an effective way for defend-
ants to preserve certain rights on appeal.270  A defendant must overcome 
numerous hurdles to obtain a conditional plea.  The Rule only allows de-
fendants to enter into conditional guilty pleas with the consent of the court 
and the government.271  A defendant, therefore, has the obstacle of obtain-
ing consent from the prosecutor before a claim can be reserved for ap-
peal.272  Prosecutors have broad discretion and may withhold such consent 
for any reason or for no reason at all.273  Further, courts are not obligated to 
accept guilty pleas.274 
                                                          
 266.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1). The court, before accepting a guilty plea, must inform the de-
fendant of and determine that the defendant understands a number of factors, including: 
(A) the government’s right . . . to use against the defendant any statement that the de-
fendant gives under oath; (B) the right to plead not guilty . . .; (C) the right to a jury tri-
al; (D) the right to be represented by counsel . . .; (E) the right at trial to confront and 
cross-examine adverse witnesses . . .; (F) the defendant’s waiver of these trial rights if 
the court accepts a plea of guilty . . .; (N) the terms of any plea-agreement provision 
waiving the right to appeal or to collaterally attack the sentence . . . . 
Id. 
 267.  Id.; Roberts, supra note 255, at 641.  
 268.  Roberts, supra note 255, at 642. 
 269.  Id. 
 270.  Brief for National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, supra note 265, at 19. Con-
tra Class v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 798, 808 (2018) (Alito, J., dissenting) (emphasizing Class 
and similarly situated defendants can enter into a conditional plea pursuant to Rule 11(a)(2)). 
 271.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(a)(2) (“With the consent of the court and the government, a defend-
ant may enter a conditional plea of guilty . . . reserving in writing the right to have an appellate 
court review an adverse determination of a specified pretrial motion.  A defendant who prevails on 
appeal may then withdraw the plea.”). 
 272.  Brief for National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, supra note 265, at 20. 
 273.  Id. (citing United States v. Fisher, 772 F.2d 371, 374 (7th Cir. 1985) (per curiam)).  
 274.  Id. at 21 (“Even a ‘blanket prohibition’ on the entry of all conditional pleas may not ‘con-
stitute error in any given case.’” (quoting United States v. Davis, 900 F.2d 1524, 1527–28 (10th 
Cir. 1990))). 
 408 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 78:382 
Prosecutors have numerous incentives for obtaining guilty pleas.275  
Guilty pleas can help prosecutors advance their careers by allowing prose-
cutors to handle more cases and boost their conviction rates.276  Prosecutors 
also use plea bargains to conserve resources and to protect their conviction 
rates.277  Prosecutors, therefore, often require specific waivers of certain 
rights before they will accept a plea agreement.278   
In addition to these prosecutorial incentives, prosecutors have im-
mense bargaining power in plea bargaining negotiations that allow them to 
easily obtain guilty pleas.279  The broad and powerful prosecutorial discre-
tion in making a plea bargain is used to persuade defendants into pleading 
guilty instead of facing severe sentences.280  Prosecutors use the nature of 
the crime to leverage their position in plea bargaining negotiations.281  Ad-
ditionally, “[p]rosecutors have virtually unchecked discretion to charge 
more- or less-serious penalties for the same act.”282  Prosecutors can also 
penalize defendants for refusing plea offers by “adding enhancements or 
charges,” which can add significant time to a defendant’s sentence if con-
victed.283  These prosecutorial incentives, combined with the immense bar-
gaining power that prosecutors have in plea bargaining negotiations, can 
make it very difficult for defendants to obtain conditional pleas.284  Essen-
tially, “the prosecutors hold all the cards” in plea bargaining negotiations.285 
                                                          
 275.  F. Andrew Hessick III & Reshma Saujani, Plea Bargaining and Convicting the Innocent: 
The Role of the Prosecutor, the Defense Counsel, and the Judge, 16 BYU J. PUB. L. 189, 191 
(2002). 
 276.  Id. at 191–92.  
 277.  Derek Teeter, Comment, A Contracts Analysis of Waivers of the Right to Appeal in Crim-
inal Plea Bargains, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 727, 737–38 (2005). 
 278.  Id.   
 279.  Cynthia Alkon, The U.S. Supreme Court’s Failure to Fix Plea Bargaining: The Impact of 
Lafler and Frye, 41 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 561, 598 (2014) (“In the context of plea bargaining, 
power imbalances are built into the structure of the system.” (citing Michael M. O’Hear, Plea 
Bargaining and Procedural Justice, 42 GA. L. REV. 407, 425 (2008)); Hessick III & Saujani, su-
pra note 275, at 194.  
 280.  Boaz Sangero, Safety From Plea Bargains’ Hazards, 38 PACE L. REV. 301, 316 (2018).  
 281.  Hessick III & Saujani, supra note 275, at 194 (“[T]he more horrible the crime, the longer 
the sentence, and the greater likelihood of a lesser included offense.”).  
 282.  Alkon, supra note 279, at 582 (citing MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: 
MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 87 (2012)). 
 283.  Id.  The additional charges and enhancements simply have to be “at least arguably sup-
ported by evidence.”  Id. at 598.  
 284.  See id. at 582–83 (noting that “prosecutors are rarely hesitant to wield [their] power” to 
convince defendants to plead guilty in order to avoid the risk of an even longer sentence).  
 285.  Id. at 599. 
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D.  The Court Properly Balanced the Competing Interests of the 
Parties 
The Court’s holding struck a proper balance between the competing 
interests of the government and defendants.  The government has an interest 
in maintaining the finality of convictions286 and conserving judicial and 
prosecutorial resources.287  Guilty pleas ensure that courts operate efficient-
ly by reducing the number of cases that go to trial and by reducing the time 
and resources that prosecutors would otherwise dedicate to trials.288  By 
contrast, defendants have an interest in “asserting the values protected by 
the particular constitutional defense at issue,”289 in limiting their probable 
sentence,290 and in not being unjustly punished by the state.291 
As demonstrated in Section IV.C., the plea-bargaining system favors 
the interests of prosecutors over the interests of defendants because of the 
disparity in bargaining power.292  Because prosecutors often demand specif-
ic waivers of rights and claims293 and threaten to penalize defendants with 
increased charges and sentencing if they do not plead guilty,294 prosecutors 
have a coercive effect on defendants when they enter into plea agree-
ments.295  While this prosecutorial power certainly promotes efficiency and 
finality of convictions, it fails to promote defendants’ interest in asserting 
constitutional values and in being free from unjust punishment.296  This 
power imbalance thus benefits the interests of prosecutors to the detriment 
of defendants’ interests. 
By upholding the validity of Class’s constitutional challenges in the 
face of a guilty plea,297 the Court helped level the playing field in the plea-
bargaining arena.298  The Court, in so holding, effectively concluded that 
                                                          
 286.  McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 774 (1970).  
 287.  Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970).  
 288.  Hessick III & Saujani, supra note 275, at 191 (asserting prosecutors are able to handle 
more cases and increase their conviction rate by obtaining guilty pleas).  
 289.  Peter Westen, Away From Waiver: A Rationale for the Forfeiture of Constitutional 
Rights in Criminal Procedure, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1214, 1238 (1977). 
 290.  Brady, 397 U.S. at 752.  
 291.  Roberts, supra note 255, at 627 (stating defendants have an “interest in being free from 
punishment”).  
 292.  Alkon, supra note 279, at 598–99; see supra notes 279–285 and accompanying text. 
 293.  Teeter, supra note 277, at 737–38 (citing United States v. Teeter, 257 F.3d 14, 22 n.4 (1st 
Cir. 2001)). 
 294.  See Alkon, supra note 279, at 582. 
 295.  Hessick III & Saujani, supra note 275, at 189 (“Scholars have also attacked plea bargain-
ing on the ground the prosecutors wield too much power over defendants and coerce them into 
accepting plea agreements which might be unfair.”). 
 296.  See supra text accompanying notes 289–291. 
 297.  Class v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 798, 807 (2018). 
 298.  See supra notes 279–285 and accompanying text (describing the great bargaining power 
prosecutors wield in plea negotiations).  
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Class’s interest in asserting his constitutional values and in potentially be-
ing free from punishment outweighed the government’s interest in finality 
and conservation of resources.299  The Court correctly granted the defend-
ant’s interest more weight in this context because the government has no 
interest in punishing constitutionally protected conduct.300  Allowing stat-
utes that criminalize protected conduct to go unchallenged “enables [the 
government] to circumvent the substantive protections provided by the con-
stitution in favor of preserving an illegitimate [governmental] interest.”301  
Although substantial, the state’s interest in finality is irrelevant when the 
Constitution does not permit the state to proscribe certain conduct.302  Be-
cause Class’s claims alleged that his conviction violated constitutional pro-
tections, the Court rightly overrode the government’s interest in finality. 
It is true, as suggested by Justice Alito, that the Court’s holding will 
place a burden on the government to defend the constitutionality of its stat-
utes, which harms the government’s interest in conserving resources.303  
However, just as the state’s interest in finality must yield to the defendant’s 
liberty interest,304 the state must likewise bear the burden of defending a 
statute’s constitutionality to ensure that the statute has not criminalized pro-
tected conduct.305  Going forward, governmental resources may be less 
strained because nothing in the Court’s holding suggests that a prosecutor 
may not obtain a waiver of the procedural right to bring a constitutional 
claim on appeal from defendants.306  In fact, the Court’s opinion may be 
read as indirectly implying that prosecutors may obtain a waiver of the right 
to challenge a statute’s constitutionality because the Court importantly not-
ed that Class’s plea agreement did not include an explicit waiver of that 
right.307 
E.  The Court Failed to Promote Uniformity in the Federal Circuits 
Several federal circuits have based their holdings regarding the rights 
of post-guilty plea defendants on the distinction between jurisdictional and 
                                                          
 299.  Class, 138 S. Ct. at 807. 
 300.  Roberts, supra note 255, at 630 (citing Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 731 
(2016)).  
 301.  Id. (citing Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 729–30, which noted convictions under an uncon-
stitutional statute are unlawful).  
 302.  Id. at 627 (citing Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 732).   
 303.  Class, 138 S. Ct. at 814 (Alito, J., dissenting); Roberts, supra note 255, at 631. 
 304.  See supra notes 300–302 and accompanying text (explaining the state’s interest in finali-
ty is irrelevant if the state criminalizes constitutionally protected conduct). 
 305.  Roberts, supra note 255, at 631–32 (citing United States v. Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 
715, 726 (1971)).  
 306.  Brief for National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, supra note 265, at 21–22. 
 307.  Class, 138 S. Ct. at 802 (majority opinion) (“The [plea] agreement said nothing about the 
right to raise on direct appeal a claim that the statute of conviction was unconstitutional.”).  
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non-jurisdictional claims and as-applied and facial constitutional challeng-
es, while other circuits have not.308  The majority of federal circuits found 
this distinction meaningful when applying the Menna-Blackledge doctrine, 
holding that the Menna-Blackledge doctrine does not apply to as-applied 
constitutional challenges because it does not prohibit the government from 
obtaining convictions under the statute against other individuals.309  In 
Class, however, the Court failed to explicitly base any part of its reasoning 
on whether Class’s claims were as-applied or facial constitutional challeng-
es.310  As a result, the Court’s decision did not resolve the federal circuits’ 
inconsistent treatment of post-guilty plea appeals, nor did it provide any 
guidance that might shed light on the issue.311  Inconsistency among the cir-
cuits is problematic because whether a criminal defendant may appeal after 
pleading guilty is contingent on the charging jurisdiction and the law fol-
lowed therein.312  This lack of uniformity is also contrary to one of the pri-
mary functions of the courts: “uniformity in the interpretation of substantive 
law.”313 
To put an end to the inconsistent application of the law in the federal 
circuits, the Court should have addressed the distinction between jurisdic-
tional and non-jurisdictional claims and between facial and as-applied chal-
lenges.314  Though few federal circuits have addressed the preclusive effect 
of guilty pleas since Class, it is clear that addressing those distinctions 
would have been helpful because post-Class cases in the Eleventh Circuit 
and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit continue to 
                                                          
 308.  See supra Section II.D.3 (discussing the distinction between as-applied and facial consti-
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 312.  See Marin K. Levy, The Mechanics of Federal Appeals: Uniformity and Case Manage-
ment in the Circuit Courts, 61 DUKE L. J. 315, 378 n.383 (2011) (“The argument for uniformity is, 
of course, well tread in the substantive law context.  Many scholars argue that citizens of different 
jurisdictions should not be subjected to different interpretations of the same law.”).  
 313.  Id. at 378 (citing Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking 
Aspects of Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1, 38 (1994)) (noting “one of the pri-
mary functions of courts is to ensure uniformity in the interpretation of substantive law” and “fed-
eral rules exist to ensure uniformity in procedure” (first citing Caminker, supra, at 38; then citing 
Erwin Chemerinsky & Barry Friedman, The Fragmentation of Federal Rules, 46 MERCER L. REV. 
757, 757 (1995)).  
 314.  See supra Section II.D (illustrating the inconsistent application of the law to post-guilty 
plea claims in the federal circuits).  
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speak in terms of jurisdiction.315  In United States v. Thomas,316 the Elev-
enth Circuit added jurisdictional language into Class’s holding and catego-
rized Class as sanctioning jurisdictional claims but barring non-
jurisdictional claims.317  In United States v. St. Hubert,318 the Eleventh Cir-
cuit, citing Class as partial support, concluded that Michael St. Hubert’s 
guilty plea did not waive his jurisdictional claim on appeal.319  Likewise, in 
United States v. Rush,320 the Fourth Circuit cited Class as support for its 
conclusion that Christopher Rush waived his right to challenge the court’s 
rulings on his pretrial motions because such a claim is a non-jurisdictional 
defect.321 
The federal circuits, with a history of applying the distinction between 
jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional claims, will likely continue to ground 
their analyses in the jurisdictional nature of claims because the Class Court 
failed to articulate a clear rule that would promote uniformity.322  The Court 
had an opportunity to address the preclusive effect of guilty pleas for the 
first time in almost thirty years, yet failed to add clarity to this area of law, 
maintaining the long-held lack of uniformity.323   
The Court should have issued an opinion aligned with the post-Broce 
majority framework in the federal circuits and adopted the distinction be-
tween jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional defects and as-applied and facial 
constitutional challenges.324  The distinction provides a clear general rule 
                                                          
 315.  See United States v. Thomas, No. 17-12665, 2018 WL 3911770, at *3 (11th Cir. Aug. 15, 
2018) (making a distinction between jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional claims).  
 316.  No. 17-12665, 2018 WL 3911770 (11th Cir. Aug. 15, 2018). 
 317.  Id. at *3–4 (asserting that Class reviewed the types of non-jurisdictional claims barred by 
a guilty plea and citing Class as support for its holding that Joseph Leroy Thomas’s non-
jurisdictional claims were barred). 
 318.  909 F.3d 335 (11th Cir. 2018). 
 319.  Id. at 343–44 (“[W]hile the Supreme Court in Class did not speak in terms of jurisdiction 
or jurisdictional indictment defects, it suggested . . . that a claim that the facts alleged in the in-
dictment and admitted by the defendant do not constitute a crime at all cannot be waived by a de-
fendant’s guilty plea because that kind of claim challenges the district court’s power to act.” (cit-
ing Class v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 798, 805 (2018))).  The court determined that Class thus 
supported the jurisdictional claim case law in the Eleventh Circuit.  Id. at 344.  
 320.  740 F. App’x 281 (4th Cir. 2018) (per curiam). 
 321.  Id. at 282 (“[B]ecause a valid guilty plea waives all prior, nonjurisdictional defects in a 
criminal proceeding, we conclude that Rush has waived his right to challenge the propriety of the 
court’s rulings on his pretrial motions.” (citing Class, 138 S. Ct. at 805)). 
 322.  See supra notes 315–321 and accompanying text; see also Class, 138 S. Ct. at 807 (Alito, 
J., dissenting) (stating it is “unclear” how the rules listed by the majority fit together).  Justice 
Alito also criticized the rule that a claim survives a guilty plea if it challenges the state’s power to 
constitutionally prosecute the defendant as “no more intelligible now than it was when first in-
canted in Blackledge.”  Id. at 814.  
 323.  See Class, 138 S. Ct. at 807 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“There is no justification for the mud-
dle left by [the majority’s] decision.”).  
 324.  See supra Section II.D.3 (discussing the distinction between as-applied and facial consti-
tutional challenges). 
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for determining whether a defendant’s claim is barred or falls within the 
Menna-Blackledge exception325 and is consistent with the underlying logic 
of the doctrine.326  As summarized by the Seventh Circuit: “[A]n as-applied 
challenge is a non-jurisdictional issue because, even if the challenge is suc-
cessful, it will not leave the court without any power to hale a defendant in-
to court under the statute.”327  A facial challenge is a jurisdictional defect 
because, if the challenge is successful, “it is by definition [unconstitutional] 
in every application, preventing a court from entering a judgment under the 
statute in any case and stripping the government of its ability to obtain a 
conviction against any defendant.”328  Thus, adopting a rule based on this 
distinction is consistent with the Menna-Blackledge doctrine because a 
claim that does “not leave a court without any power to bring a defendant 
into court under the statute” does not fall within the Menna-Blackledge ex-
ception.329  Although as-applied and facial constitutional challenges were 
not clearly presented by Class’s claims, the Court should have used this op-
portunity to provide as much guidance and clarity as possible in furtherance 
of promoting uniform law in the federal circuits. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In Class v. United States, the Supreme Court held that a guilty plea 
does not bar a federal criminal defendant from challenging the constitution-
ality of the statute of conviction because such a claim does not contradict 
the defendant’s admissions and challenges the government’s power to con-
stitutionally prosecute the defendant.330  The Court correctly applied the 
Menna-Blackledge exception to Class’s claims because a claim that a stat-
ute is unconstitutional challenges the power of the government to constitu-
tionally convict the defendant under that statute, and the Court’s holding 
was consistent with Broce because Class’s claims do not contradict the 
conduct admitted in his guilty plea.331  Further, the holding was consistent 
with Rule 11 because Rule 11(a)(2) does not set forth the exclusive proce-
dure for a post-guilty plea defendant to bring a claim on appeal.332  The 
Court also properly protected defendants’ important procedural rights be-
cause the option to enter a conditional plea pursuant to Rule 11(a)(2) is an 
insufficient protection given the immense bargaining power of prosecutors 
                                                          
 325.  See United States v. Phillips, 645 F.3d 859, 863 (7th Cir. 2011) (stating an as-applied 
challenge is a non-jurisdictional issue and is thus waived by entry of a guilty plea). 
 326.  See Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 30 (1974) (holding that a claim is not barred if it 
involves the defendant’s claimed right not to be haled into court at all).  
 327.  Phillips, 645 F.3d at 863. 
 328.  Id. 
 329.  Id.  
 330.  Class v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 798, 804–05 (2018). 
 331.  See supra Section IV.A. 
 332.  See supra Section IV.B.  
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in plea negotiations.333  Moreover, the Court properly balanced the compet-
ing interests at stake by effectively holding that the government has no in-
terest in punishing constitutionally protected conduct.334  The Court, how-
ever, failed to address the distinction between jurisdictional and non-
jurisdictional claims and facial and as-applied challenges.335  Accordingly, 
the Court did not articulate a rule that would promote clarity and uniformity 
in the federal circuits.336  To clean the murky waters of guilty plea jurispru-
dence, the Court should have adopted the distinction between jurisdictional 
and non-jurisdictional defects and facial and as-applied challenges.337  This 
lack of guidance from the Supreme Court may leave the waters cloudy for 
many years into the future. 
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